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Let me anticipate, right from the outset, the answers to the two questions in the title. 
The first main point is that Physics and Christian Theology are moving in opposite 
epistemological climates, when they are speaking about the same common object. 
Here both terms are important: opposite – which is nothing special – and 
epistemological climate – which is very special. Epistemological questions are 
considered difficult and normally bypassed. 
The second main point is that a possible amendment of that situation consists in trying 
to get a control of the cognitive losses of Physics. 
 
Content:  I. Four lengthy preliminary reminders 
 II. Reductionisms and models in Physics and their epistemological climate 
 III. The epistemological climate in Christian revelation 
 IV. Intermediate Conclusion: opposition of epistemological climates 
V. Thoughts about how to avoid the opposition: the idea of control 
 VI. Space and dynamics 
VII. Invariable combinations of invariable properties: the re-emergence of 
“substance thinking“ 
 VIII. First features of the control and final remark 
 
 
I. Four lengthy preliminary reminders 
 
1. The common object of Physics and Christian Theology: material things. A 
dialogue of two different domains of knowledge must refer to what is common to both, 
i.e. to a common object. This can be determined most easily by exclusion: the 
common object demands from physics the restriction of not speaking of and not 
even making implicit reference to mathematics (because Theology has no 
Mathematics at all), and from theology the restriction of not speaking of God and 
not even making implicit reference to God. It is important to be very strict from the 
very outset. There are many discussions where theologians speak about creation, even 
though this does not belong to the common object. And in all discussions, physicists 
rely implicitly or explicitly on Mathematics when speaking about material things. 
 
After this amputation on both sides one might wonder whether there remains 
anything common. We then can remember that Physics grew out of the old 
philosophy of nature, which in turn grew out of ordinary experience and langugage. And 
Christian revelation and theology rely on ordinary experience and language. This 
means that the common object of both Physics and Theology is precisely this: ordinary 
experience and language. Sometimes, this is called ’Common  Sense’ or, with a more 
philosophical touch, ’Natural Realism’. 
 
‘Natural Realism’ refers to the way of thinking that can be found everywhere throughout 
antiquity until the high Middle Ages. Thereafter it is confined to the philosophical 
traditions which have maintained that way of thinking such as Aristotelians, Thomists, also 
a certain group of Phenomenologists, to mention the main currents. On the other hand, 
Rationalists and Empiricists, Kantians and most Analytic philosophers would group 
themselves more or less apart from Natural Realism. 
 
At a first glance, all that might look as an undeclared methodical naturalism. However, 
that would be a sort of  claim a priori, i.e. a claim before the effort to understand material 
things in the light of ordinary experience has come to an end. The claim cannot be made 
before an end has been unequivocally reached. However, one must take into account that 
modern natural science has found herself, after having answered one question, before ten  
new questions. And as the scientific exploration of things has started from what we know 
by ordinary experience, it seems likely that such ordinary experience contains more than 
some simple “brute facts”. It is not excluded that it is due to that experience that the inquiry 
will never come to an end, however great the increase of knowledge may be. 
 
Therefore, the following considerations are not inscribed in a methodical naturalism. 
Rather, the question of the reference to a Creator is open. It might be added that some 
philosophers speak of a ‘natural theology’ whose result is precisely the being created of 
material things and the existence of their Creator. But in the limits of the following 
considerations, we are not dealing with natural theology. Returning to our topic, we 
interpret the quantiative proliferation of information, scientific and other, as an authentic 
growth of insight. That in turn suggests to make the intelligibility of material things a central 
concept in our considerations. Altogether: material things are the common object, and their 
intelligibility is the common aspect to be investigated, not laws of nature, not their being 
created. 
 
2. The historical development: The requirement of leaving Mathematics out of the 
relationship between Physics and Theology, seems to pose a considerable handicap to 
Physics, because Mathematics has an important role in Physics. Some analytic 
philosophers speak, in this context, even about the ’indispensability argument’. It is true 
that Physics grew out of philosophy of nature developed in antiquity, and that 
philosophy of nature dealt with individual material things. But then came the scientific 
revolution of the 16th and 17 th centuries, the greatest singular issue of which was 
precisely the mathematization of physics. Since then, the mathematization of Physics 
has grown, and nowadays Mathematics seems to have a dominant role. Yet, Physics 
continues dealing with individual material things and, thus, can hardly be identified with 
Mathematics. 
 
Limiting oneself to ordinary experience as the common object seems to be tantamount 
of going back to the times before the Scientific Revolution. But that is not so clear 
when we take into account that 
 
3. it is not known why Mathematics is successful in Physics. In fact, the lack of 
understanding the Mathematization of Physics has bothered many scientists and 
constitutes a major and unsolved philosophical problem until our days.. Let the 
following quotations speak for themselves: 
 
First, Albert Einstein: The world of experience and the world of concepts are united in the 
same person, but experiences do not influence the shaping of concepts and vice versa. 
Therefore it is possible that “all concepts, even those which are closest to experience, are 
from the point of logic freely chosen conventions, just as is the case with the concept of 
causality.”1 And even more explicitly: “The theoretical attitude here advocated is distinct 
from that of Kant only by the fact that we do not conceive of the “categories” as unalterable 
…, but as … free conventions. They appear to be a priori only insofar as thinking without 
the positing of categories and of concepts in general would be as impossible as is 
breathing in a vacuum.”2 Nevertheless, the hermetic separation of the two worlds coexists 
with their (ununderstandable) correlation: “The very fact that the totality of our sense 
experiences is such that by means of thinking (…) it can be put in order, this fact is one 
which leaves us in awe, but which we never shall understand. … The fact that it is 
comprehensible is a miracle.”3 
 
The Einsteinian formula ‘incomprehensibility of the comprehensibility’ goes hand in  hand 
with his view that the scientist’s epistemological attitude is divided into strongly opposed 
parts: “The scientist … must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of 
unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as a realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world 
independent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts 
and theories as the free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is 
empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified 
only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory 
experiences. He may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the 
viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his research.”  4 
 
Second, Eugene P. Wigner: "The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of 
mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither 
understand nor deserve.”5 
 
Third, Richard P. Feynman: "I think, it is safe to say, that no one understands quantum 
mechanics. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you possibly can avoid it, "But how can it be 
like that?" because you will go "down the drain" into a blind alley from which nobody has 
yet escaped. Nobody can know how it can be like that".6 
 
Fourth, Roger Penrose: "I should begin by expressing my general attitude to present day 
quantum theory, by which I mean standard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The 
theory has, indeed, two powerful bodies of fact in its favour, and only one thing against it. 
First, in its favour are all the marvellous agreements that the theory has had with every 
experimental result to date. Second, and to me almost as important, it is a theory of 
 
1 Einstein, A. Autobiographical Notes, in Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) Albert Einstein - Philosopher and Scientist. La Salle (Illino is, 
USA): Open Court, 1949 (first edition), p. 13. 
2 Einstein, A. Remarks concerning the essays …., in Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) Albert Einstein - Philosopher and Scientist. La 
Salle (Illinois, USA): Open Court, 1949 (first edition), p. 674. 
3 Einstein, A. Physics and Reality. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.: Journal of The Franklin Institute, 1936, 221,3, 
p. 351. 
4 Einstein, A. Remarks concerning the essays …., in Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) Albert Einstein - Philosopher and Scientist. La 
Salle (Illinois, USA): Open Court, 1949 (first edition), p. 684. 
5 Wigner, E. P. The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. Communications in Pure and 
Applied Mathematics, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960, vol. 13, No.1, last paragraph. Also accessible on -line, 
for instance, at www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/Wigner.html. Wigner is a major figure in the development 
of quantum theory during the 30’s, 40’s and 50’s of the 20 th century. 
6 Feynman, R.P., The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967, p. 129. Feynman is a major figure in 
the development of quantum theory during the 40’s, 50’s and 60’s of the 20 th century. 
astonishing and profound mathematical beauty. The one thing that can be said against it is 
that it makes absolutely no sense!"7 
 
* 
 
These quotations represent the general view. They all reflect that, since several 
centuries, physics is built upon two different bodies of knowledge, namely experience 
and mathematics. While it is unknown why and how mathematics is connected to 
material things, there is a huge body of experience of the true success of mathematical 
physics in the whole range between elementary particles and cosmological objects. 
This allows the statement that these two bodies of knowledge are somehow 
interlocked. In other words, physics has been transformed from a purely theoretical 
science aimed at the knowledge of truth, into a practical science not unsimilar to 
engineering. 
 
This situation may give a hint to where to focus our attention. In order to corroborate 
this, consider the following fictitious conversation about the importance of modern 
physics for mankind, between a physicist and an interested non -physicist. At a given 
moment, the physicist stresses the capacity of physics for predicting future events or 
looking into the past in virtue of mathematical laws of nature. Then the non-physicist asks 
him: 
 
- What are you speaking about? About mathematical theories or about this material world? What is 
the connection between mathematical theories and the material world? And, still more important: 
Where is the connection between mathematical theories and the material world? What can be seen 
f rom outside is only that physicists apply certain mathematical theories to material things. That 
means that there is made a connection between both mathematics and the experienced material 
world, in the physicist. But it remains unclear, whether there is a connection between mathematics 
and the material world itself. As you know, Einstein insisted many times that physical concepts are 
pure invention, because they have no relationship whatsoever with sense experience (He admired 
Kant, who said practically the same.). Therefore, he stated equally of ten, that it is a “miracle” that our 
theories are so successful. 
- Let me answer to your initial question: of course, I am speaking about this material world. 
- But on what grounds can you do that? If  you join the stance of  Kant, with Einstein and others, you 
cannot maintain that you are speaking about this world while using mathematical terms. On the other 
hand, if  you think that physical concepts have to do with material things that we perceive, you have 
changed sides and passed, so to speak, f rom Kant to Aristotle.  
- To be honest, I cannot tell on what grounds I have said ‘about this material world’, because I’m not 
sure. I feel myself  inclined to a mixture of  both extremes, to something like Hawking’s stance who 
said: "There is no picture- or theory-independent concept of  reality. Instead we adopt a view that we 
call model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a model (generally 
of  a mathematical nature) and a set of  rules that connect the elements of  the model to observations 
...” and “Your reality depends on the model you employ”. (Italics are mine) 
- But that is not satisfactory. Natural scientists are inclined to admit a world, which has its properties 
independently of  whether they are investigated or known. Of  course, here is a problem as to what is 
meant by ‘properties’. Leaving that question aside, one feels uncomfortable with the idea that there 
are only dif ferent models, which correspond to dif ferent realities. Isn’t there a way to jump out this 
prison called ‘model’ or ‘models’? 
- Perhaps; who knows? But allow me one question: are you aiming at eliminating the models 
altogether and thus renounce of  predictions and technology?! You cannot possibly throw out the 
window something that has proven to be successful! 
 
7 Penrose, R. Gravity and State Vector Reduction, in: R.Penrose and C.J.Isham (eds.), Quantum Concepts in Space and 
Time; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 129. Penrose is a major figure in the development of mathematical tools in 
quantum and relativity theory during the 70’s and 80’s of the 20 th century. 
- No, I don’t want to throw anything out. But I would like to know why the models are successful. The 
natural claim is that the models root, in one way or other, in the material things they describe. But to 
claim that is one thing and to prove that claim, is another.  
- Ok, but is it your goal to prove that claim, if  you are not going to dismiss the models? 
- Yes, exactly. I feel it necessary to go beyond making statements that an experiment has conf irmed a 
hypothesis to a certain degree of  precision, or has failed to conf irm such hypothesis. In other wo rds,  
my goal is to investigate in depth the relationship between model and the reality the model pretends 
to picture. Don’t you think that physics would become better if  we knew the answer to that question? 
Wouldn’t it be a good combination to keep, on the one hand, physics as it has developed until today 
and, on the other hand, know what physicists are really doing when using models? 
- It seems to be a dif ficult question. But why care about it at all, as long as Physics continues being so  
successful? Wouldn’t we loose the competitivity of our civilization, if  we – a number of  people with an 
adequate academic preparation for that purpose - invest an uncertain amount of  time in order to try 
to reshape Physics, without having a clear idea of  what would be the outcome? 
Additionally, wouldn’t that mean to radically change the basic mindset? Wouldn’t it be in opposi tion 
to contemporary mainstream positions in epistemology and philosophy of  mathematics and 
philosophy of  physics? And which method should be followed in such investigation? What would  be 
its starting point? No, no, there are too many risks. 
- This answer seems to move on a predominantly practical level. Therefore, I cannot but challenge 
your speaking about the success of  mathematical theories in Physics. What, in rigor, is success? To  
the date, the success never has been absolute, with total precision, but only with relative precision. 
And it is only in a certain domain, say low energies, high energies, and so on. Doubtlessly, this is 
already very much. But we are faced here with a serious option: do we want to proceed, in tackling 
this problem, in the spirit of engineers or in the spirit of philosophers? 
Engineers aim at ef f icient technology and push the precision ahead as far as they need it, and 
neglect the question why on earth does relative precision exist at all. On the other hand, 
philosophers do not neglect but rather focus, for instance, on the question of  what precision is and 
why on earth it is only relative. For engineering, a working model is suf f icient. But for philosophy, any 
simplif ication or abstraction f rom things because they are considered as irrelevant, can be fatal. In 
other words: it seems that one cannot avoid making a basic option: either engineer or philosopher.  
 
4. A basic decision has to be made: either more engineering or more 
philosophizing; Highly influential in shaping a science is the contrast between 
practical goals and theoretical insight. Experience shows that one does not need 
Quantum Theory in order to construct a bridge, or General Relativity for jedging a 100m 
–race. There is a difference between success and understanding, between neglecting 
“dirt effects“ and trying to understand why there are such realities called “dirt effects“ by 
engineers. Into the same context should be grouped abstractions and simplifications. In 
order to achieve a practical goal, respecting deadlines, costs and safety, abstractions 
and simplifications are fully justified. But this ordinarily goes at the expenses of 
understanding the natural processes one is dealing with . 
 
One argument to discard “dirt effects“ consists in claiming that “experience has  shown 
that this and that phenomenon is just a “dirt effect““. That is not quite true, because in 
most cases, if not in all, no experience is available of situations where this and that 
phenomenon is absent. For instance, gravitation is considered very small in 
comparison with the electroweak “force“, let alone in comparison with the strong 
subatomic force. But gravitation cannot be eliminated, so that the “gravitationfree“ 
experience does not exist. The case of mechanical friction that makes movements 
diminish xxxxxxxx 
 
An equivalent wording to ’more engineering or more philosophizing’ is given by the 
concepts of success and truth. Success is limited and gradual, whereas truth is 
bivalent, i.e. not gradual. That is to say that success and truth never are identical. 
Nevertheless, success is true. It is this double-sided relationship between success 
and truth, that makes that Physics needs some non-practical understanding of ist 
practical side – so to speak, a philosophy of experiment, in particular measuremen t -, 
while the truth of success makes it reasonable to expect that such an understanding 
exists – success and truth are not categories completely alien to each other. 
 
But if one is not satisfied with that situation that success and truth co-exist, i.e. without 
understanding the foundation of their coexisting, one feels the need of a philosophical 
answer to the question what an experiment and, more specifically, a measurement is. 
 
The solution of this problem consists, in general lines, in a certain foundation of 
mathematical structures on the material things they are thought to refer to. The other 
direction would be an interpretation of physico-mathematical theories by their material 
instances. As is well known, everybody speaks about interpretations of theories. They 
start always from such physico-mathematical theories and pretend to arrive at this real 
world. Conversely, a foundation departs from this real world and arrives either at 
physico-mathematical theories or at a certain frame of them, which controls the losses. 
Both approaches have to cope with the difference between the individual and the 
abstract. But meanwhile a theory does not contain individual elements, the 
question remains to be examined whether individual material things contain 
abstract or non-individual elements. 
 
 
II. Reductionisms and models in Physics and their epistemological 
climate 
 
IIa. Reductionisms 
 
Mainly during the Scientific Revolution, experiments have come to occupy their systematic 
place in Physics they have continued keeping until our days. In order to not lose ourselves 
in historical considerations, we give here just a list of the measures taken by physicists in 
order to make individual material things and their changes and abstract mathematical 
theories fitting to each other. Let us put emphasis, above all, on the contrast between the 
unsubstitutably individual and abstract-non individual, that has to be “bridged” by the 
physicist. It is clear that this cannot be achieved by material devices, but has to be done by 
the experimenter’s mind. This is to say that the experimenter is an indispensable part of a 
physico-mathematical theory, which is an insight that is quite often overlooked. 
 
In order to pinpoint the difficulties linked to the contrast individual-non individual, the 
Schrödinger cat-paradox is a good instance. … 
 
After this warning, we present the promised list of measures taken by the experimenter: 
 
(i) The experimenter chooses two material things. By doing so, he gives them a 
preferential position with respect to the rest of the world. At the same time, he assigns 
them the functions ‘object’ and ‘experimental apparatus’ in an experiment to be carried 
out by him. In doing so, he chooses between two alternatives by determining which of 
the two sides should be considered the object and which the apparatus. The two 
possible attributions of ‘object/apparatus’ to the two sides exclude each other, in the 
same experimental process. Neither the categories ‘object’ and ‘apparatus’ nor the 
subsequent choice of one of the two alternatives have a foundation in nature. They 
have their exclusive roots in the interests of the experimenter-investigator; 
 
(ii) The experimenter puts spatial limits to experiments, even though their real connection 
with the rest of the world continues unaltered. But that real connection gets lost in the 
theory; 
 
(iii) The experimenter stops his intervention by his own initiative. Only this makes possible a 
result, though at the expenses of separating it from the “ongoing flow of nature”; 
 
(iv) The experimenter mentally isolates part of the experiment from the whole, i.e. the 
result, by abstracting from the process the termination of which brings about that result. 
Exceptions are instantaneous processes (particle decays and -reactions), because 
there the process is identical with its result; 
 
(v) The experimenter almost entirely abstracts from the apparatus after having used it by 
attributing the result to the object only instead of equally to both sides. This has no 
foundation in nature, but exclusively in the experimenter-investigator’s interests; 
 
(vi) The experimenter weakens the relevance of the observations concomitant to the 
experiment and often replaces experiences by results of experiments (e.g., the colours 
seen by wave lengths measured). Through the concomitant observations, it is known 
that the reductionisms (i) – (v) are precisely this: reductionisms. 
 
None of the experimenter’s six interventions corresponds to anything in nature. The results 
of investigation obtained under such conditions do not refer to the true nature, but rather to 
its reductionist picture. The reductionist picture is successful, but not true. Rather they 
contain a lack of truth. At first sight, the six interventions seem to add something to the true 
picture of nature. But in reality, all these interventions take away reality and thus cause 
losses in the knowledge of the full material reality. 
 
IIb. Models 
 
After having established a bridge to mathematical structures by means of the above 
reductionisms, the work of the theoretical physicist consists in making out of such 
mathematical structures a physico-mathematical theory. The main guideline for this task is 
the correspondence between theory and experiment. Secondary guidelines deal with the 
extension of what is called ‘validity’ of the theory, conceptual economy, mathematical 
beauty and similar issues. 
 
The mind of model-making is beautifully expressed in a text by Heinrich Hertz, who could 
even be called the father of the concept ‘model’: 
 
“The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our conscious 
knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation of future events, so that we 
may arrange our present affairs in accordance with such anticipation. … In endeavouring 
thus to draw inferences as to the future from the past, we always adopt the following 
process. We form for ourselves images [innere Scheinbilder] or symbols of external objects; 
and the form which we give them is such that 
 
- now comes the first key passage - 
 
the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary 
consequents in nature of the things pictured.” 8 (italics are mine) 
 
Here we have clearly expressed the motivation for making models: to predict events or 
processes. And to predict not just in order to know, but in order to be able to act now in 
prevision of what is going to happen later. It is this what makes possible machines, 
 
8 Hertz, Heinrich. The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form. London. McMillan, 1899, p.1. 
because if future events can be controlled by making suitable arrangements in the presen t 
moment, you can let the process doing its work “alone”, because you already know the 
result. After having introduced the notion of model, he goes on mentioning some of there 
properties, among others the following: 
 
“… The images which we here speak of are our conceptions of things. With the things 
themselves they are in conformity in one important respect, namely, in satisfying the above-
mentioned, requirement. For our purpose it is not necessary that they should be in conformity 
with the things in any other respect whatever. As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have 
we any means of knowing, whether our conceptions of things are in conformity with them in 
any other than this one fundamental respect. … 
 
- And here comes the second key passage - 
 
The images which we may form of things are not determined without ambiguity by the 
requirement that the consequents of the images must be the images of the consequents.” 
(Italics are mine)9 
 
Altogether, physical models are considered to be not uniquely determined by the material 
reality they are supposed to picture. Therefore, they also reflect the genius of the model 
maker and not only the reality of the material things involved. The model of a process is 
successful in the sense that it predicts the development of that process. 
 
Even though Hertz does not mention it, the experimental practice shows without exception  
that prediction is possible only up to a relative precision. This relative precision can be 
good, high or even excellent. ‘Relatively precise’ can mean ‘exact with a margin of 2% 
deviation’, or of 0,2% deviation, or of 0,02% deviation – but of a deviation anyway. Relative 
precision can vary over a range and, thus, is not identical with truth. A model’s success 
might be true, but that does not mean that the model is true. The reason is that it does not 
make sense to say that a model is ‘more or less true’ or ‘true within certain margins’. 
 
The bifurcation between truth and success (allowing for little deviations) makes that 
understanding a model is not the same as understanding the corresponding natural things. 
It is not possible to substitute success for truth or vice versa. Instead of one criterion for 
judging a discourse in Physics, one has now two criteria which never coincide. Because 
of that gap, the epistemological climate of Physics becomes “foggy” or even dark. It can 
only be brightened up when one achieves an understanding of the link between natural 
things and the pertinent model that goes beyond the category of success. 
 
To the “darkening of the epistemological climate” of physics exists another contribution 
stemming from abstractions, idealizations and simplifications. They are very often carried 
out in order to make the models manageable in a practical way. It is the stated intention to 
leave the "main effect" untouched, the latter being judged according to the rules of art, 
from the perspective of existing models. Of course, this does not change the reality 
experienced, but only the model from the physicist’s side. In other words, the reality is 
independent of the model. Nevertheless, the abstractions, idealizations and simplifications 
make that the full reality must be described with fewer elements. The incompleteness 
emerging here may then be bridged by hypotheses. Precisely this is the additional 
darkening of the epistemological climate. 
 
In addition to the needs of Physics comes the historical philosophical climate. The 
idea of making models is not only supported by the desire of being able to arrange our 
 
9 Hertz, Heinrich. The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form. London. McMillan, 1899, p. 2. 
present affairs in accordance with a model that predicts the consequences of present 
actions. The philosophical tradition shaped by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in particular 
its epistemological aspects, is very likely to have supported the making of models, 
because it claims that knowledge of natural things stems, by and large, from man himself. 
In order to substantiate that, we need only recall some key quotations from Kant’s Critique 
of pure reason: “Although all our knowledge begins with experience, that doesn’t mean 
that it all comes from experience.”10 For "[t]he order and regularity in appearances, which 
we call Nature, are put there by ourselves. We could never find them in appearances if it 
weren’t that we, or the nature of our mind, had first put them there."11 
 
And a little bit later, another reference to the copernican turn: “Even though it might seem 
counterintuitive, the understanding isn’t a mere power of formulating rules through 
comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of Nature. It’s only through the 
understanding that Nature exists at all! …. Nature is the synthetic unity of the manifold of 
appearances according to rules. And appearances can’t exist outside us—they exist only 
in our sensibility. Thus, Nature … is possible only in the unity of self -awareness.”12 
 
In fact, it is known from Hertz’s diaries that he was an avid reader of Kant’s writings. The 
same is true with respect to Einstein. Therefore, it is likely that their views in Physics were 
influenced by Kant’s thinking. It is not surprising, then, that the epistemological climate in 
Physics in general has become increasingly Kantian. This leads to a sort of exchange of 
roles: it is not any more the real world only that determines the properties of the model, but 
it is the model that increasingly determines what the real material world should be like. The 
genius of the model maker becomes more and more important. 
 
This change is reflected in the concept of ‘theory-ladenness of experience’ which , in our 
context, can be characterized by saying that the experiences or observations are affected 
by the theories held by the observer or experimenter. This idea – although not the word - is 
contained in the following text, written by Karl Popper (1902-1994) in 1935: 
 
”Even the careful and sober testing of our ideas by experience is in its turn inspired by ideas: 
experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by theory. We do not stumble 
upon our experiences, nor do we let them flow over us like a stream. Rather, we have to be 
active: we have to ‘make’ our experiences. It is we who always formulate the questions to be 
put to nature; it is we who try again and again to put these questions so as to elicit a clear-cut 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ (for nature does not give an answer unless pressed for it). And in the end, it is 
again we who give the answer, it is we ourselves who, after severe scrutiny, decide upon the 
answer to the question we put to nature”13. 
 
A contemporary voice confirms that the idea of theory-ladenness of experiences continues 
being influential. The following passages stem from Stephen Hawking (1942-2018) and 
represent, by and large, the mindset of the overwhelming majority of physicists. The two 
first paragraphs show, how models might carry the model maker from the observed “real 
reality” away to a theory-shaped reality, i.e. to theory-laden observations. The last 
sentence shows that it is only a small step from the theory-ladenness of observations to 
the theory-createdness of observations: 
 
10 I. K a n t . Critique of pure Reason (2. edition, 1787), www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf , 
margin number 1. 
11 I. K a n t . Critique of pure Reason (first edition, 1781), www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf, 
marginal number A125. 
12 I. K a n t . Critique of pure Reason (first edition, 1781), www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf, 
marginal number A127. 
13 Popper, Karl R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 280. Hutchinson & Co. 11959, Routledge (Routledge Classics), 
London 32002. 
 
"There is no picture- or theory-independent concept of reality. Instead we adopt a view that 
we call model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a model 
(generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the 
model to observations ...” 14 
 
”According to the idea of model-dependent realism … our brains interpret the input f rom our 
sensory organs by making a model of the outside world. We form mental concepts of our 
home, trees, other people, the electricity that flows from wall sockets, atoms, molecules, and 
other universes. These mental concepts are the only reality we can know. There is no model-
independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its 
own." 15 
 
“Your reality depends on the model you employ” 16 
 
Now, if models were only meant to construct machines or bring about other products of 
engineering, the ranking of success before mere knowledge would be perfectly legitimate. 
It is really astonishing how successful this method work, even after all the severe 
interventions of the physicist, which we have pinpointed so far with the concepts of 
reductionism and model. Accordingly, if the models are claimed to tell how things really 
are, then it is obvious that the question is not about engineering, but about man’s 
relationship to reality at all. And this is a philosophical stance. Therefore, it is necessary to 
sharply distinguish between the point of view of engineering, on the one hand, and of 
philosophy, on the other. 
 
As a matter of fact, the dominating mindset among physicists and in society in general is 
inclining to conflate or mix the engineering stance with the philosophical one and say: 
Because a model is successful, it must be true. This opinion is not limited to professional 
physicists, but spreads through school education and the many programmes for the 
popularization of science to all members of society. However, such a mindset has little to 
do with Common Sense. 
 
The way of doing Physics is almost fully determined by the reductionisms and by the fact 
that Physics deals more with models of reality than with reality itself. Both together yield 
the following characterization of the epistemological climate: 
 
(i) Physics is not aiming at truth, but at success. Nevertheless, the success is a true one. 
 
(ii) In order to achieve that success, Physics does not focus on real material things, but 
fabricates abstract models of those material things. Such models are not uniquely 
determined and, thus, more or less hypothetical. Additionally, these models abstract 
from the major part of reality in order to investigate the remains. Furthermore, they use 
to make major simplifications. These abstractions and simplifications are losses for the 
pretended knowledge of material realities, i.e. they make impossible to achieve a full 
knowledge of what material things are and why and how they behave as they do. In 
other words, they are reductionisms. 
 
 
14 Hawking, Stephen; Mlodinow, Leonid, The Grand Design – A New Explanation of the Universe, New York, Bantam 
Books, 2010. p. 42. 
15 Hawking, Stephen; Mlodinow, Leonid, The Grand Design – A New Explanation of the Universe, New York, Bantam 
Books, 2010. p. 172. 
16 Hawking, Stephen; Mlodinow, Leonid, The Grand Design – A New Explanation of the Universe, New York, Bantam 
Books, 2010. p. 175. 
(iii) The hypothetical character of those models as well as their lack of correspondence to 
the material reality prepares the way for an ever increasing skepticism. despite of the 
sharp rationality of Mathematics, the use of which in Physics is ever increasing. 
 
 
III. The epistemological climate in Christian revelation 
 
Embedded in ordinary language. Christian revelation and, thus, Christian Theology 
focuses on God and on man and the world insofar they are related to God. This is a 
conclusion based on the biblical text. The Bible contains notions such as Creator, God, 
create, image (Gen 1:26.27) together with the greatest commandment of loving God above 
all things (Dt 6:5; Mt 22:38-40), Soul, Angel, Bread of life, living Bread, Holy Spirit, Father, 
and many others. They are not isolated pieces like a foreign body in a living organism, bu t 
semantically and inseparably interwoven with the surrounding text made of every-day’s 
language. Even much more: on every page, the mystery of God shines through in an 
unspeakable way. Furthermore, there is an analogical meaning of material things for the 
Kingdom of Heaven (for instance the pearl, the treasure, etc., cf. Mt 13) as well as, for 
instance, the sacramental meaning of water in Baptism. The Bible in general and Jesus in  
particular use common language which carries also implicitly the view this language refers 
to things. Altogether, there exists a most intimate co-presence of ordinary language and 
reality and biblical-theological language and reality. One might say that the use of human 
means of communication is a sort of “natural” way God has chosen to reveal himself. 
 
Another important point must be stressed: the God of Christian revelation is the God of 
truth and, thus, of intrinsic intelligibility. The Old Testament precedes God’s self-revelation  
through His Son (Hebr 1:2), and the New Testament follows this self -revelation, which was 
already prepared in the Old Testament (cf. Lk 24:27; Jo 5:39). Furthermore, the Son 
indicates as reason for that He calls the apostles ’friends’ that He has made them know all  
that He has heard from His Father (cf. Jo 15:15; Mt 11:25). And the Son promises the 
assistance of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth, who will bring to their remembrance all that 
He has said to them (cf. Jo 14:17; 15:26.27; Jo 16:13). The triune God is the God of 
truth, communication and transparence. 
 
On the other hand, ordinary language carries the insight that natural things possess an 
intrinsic intelligibility. This insight is an essential characteristic of a philosophical stance 
that also has led to its name ‘Natural Realism’. Therefore, Natural Realism extends to any 
other sort of (purely human) knowledge and cannot be left behind in order to step over, for 
instance, to an artificial language and a purely immanent representation of what the 
subject conceives as real. Taking into account that God uses ordinary human language in  
order to convey His revelation, it follows that Christian Theology and Natural Realism are 
intimately related with each other. Both cannot be separated from each other. 
 
Notice that the intelligibility first belongs to the objects of the domain of knowledge in 
question. However, as the term ‘intelligibility’ refers also to the mind that “hosts” the 
knowledge in question, the notion of intelligibility refers inseparably to both object and 
subject of knowledge. Here, the object has a logical priority: the mind can have an insight 
into the object, because the object is intelligible. All these are insights of Natural Realism. 
 
* 
 
Before going on, three pertinent statements of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church 
might be quoted for supporting the view of the relationship between Christian revelation 
and Natural Realism just proposed. The first statement stems from the Encyclical Fides et 
ratio (FR, 1998) by Pope John Paul II. In the final part of this document, the Pope 
encourages scientists, to do their science within a “sapiential horizon” (FR 106,2). While it 
is not made explicit in that passage, what precisely this sapiential horizon is, it is clear that 
natural sciences are situated within such a horizon, which excludes the alternative that 
natural sciences themselves constitute such a sapiential horizon. 
 
Now, the text of Fides et ratio as a whole presents a positive view of the human capacity of 
insight, which means above all other things a metaphysical knowledge, and a metaphysics 
of being. It is worthwile noting that Fides et ratio uses the term ‘metaphysics of being’ and 
its equivalents 23 times17. This is why scholars have qualified this Encyclical as the first 
document of the Magisterium that does not only recommend that philosophers and 
theologians draw their leading ideas from a realist philosophy (and theology) in general 
and that of Thomas Aquinas in particular but, specifically, by a realist metaphysics18. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Natural Realism is the main piece of the sapiential 
horizon mentioned in FR 106,2. In other words, it is Natural Realism that should be the 
philosophical frame for the natural sciences. As we have seen, at present it is not. 
 
The second magisterial statement consists of three passages taken from the address of 
Pope John Paul II on 23.4.1993, shortly after the publication, by the Pontifical Biblical 
Commission, of the document The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church. One of the 
main ideas of the address is the “harmony between Catholic exegesis and the Mystery of 
Incarnation“ (section  2). Among the passages relevant for the relationship between 
Theology and Natural Realism are, above all, the following three. In these passages, the 
expression ’human language’ should be understood as parallel to ’Natural Realism’: 
 
”The God of the Bible is not an absolute Being who, crushing everything he touches, would 
suppress all differences and all nuances. On the contrary, he is God the Creator, who 
created the astonishing variety of beings “each according to its kind”, as the Genesis account 
says repeatedly (Gen 1). Far from destroying differences, God respects them and makes use 
of them (cf. 1 Cor 12:18.24.28). Although he expresses himself in human language he does 
not give each expression a uniform value, but uses its possible nuances with extreme 
flexibility and likewise respects its limitations. … None of the human aspects of language can 
be neglected.” (no. 8)  
 
and. on the other hand: 
 
“The Sacred Books cannot be likened to ordinary writings, but, since they have been dictated 
by the Holy Spirit himself and have extremely serious contents, mysterious and difficult in 
many respects, we always need, in order to understand and explain them, the coming of the 
same Holy Spirit, that is, his light and grace, which must certainly be sought in humble prayer 
and preserved by a life of holiness”. (no. 9)19 
 
17 Knasas, John F.X., "Fides et Ratio" and the Twentieth Century Thomistic Revival . in: New Blackfriars, Vol. 81, No. 955 
(September 2000), pp. 400-408. see also: John Knasas on Thomist Metaphysics: Past, Present and Future, 
https://www.innerexplorations.com/philtext/john.htm . 
18 Fides et ratio contains more specifications so that one can say that The Church Does Have a Philosophy of Her Own , 
as a scholar (Alan Vincelette) puts it as a title of an article with the subtitle ”Ruminations on Fides et Ratio and the Firs t 
Principles of Catholic Philosophy”. Bogoslovni Vestnik (Theological Quarterly) 73 (2013) 1, 17-46 (Faculty of Theology of  
the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia). The author mentions twelve first principles, in particular 1. Foundational Empirism  
(Experience is the foundation of philosophical knowledge), 3. Epistemological Realism (Correspondence Theory of  the 
Truth) and 7. Natural Theology (Metaphysics is Prior to Science). 
19 Address of His Holiness John Paul II on the Interpretation of the Bible in the Church, on April 23 rd 1993, con occasion 
of the publication (15.4.1993), by the Pontifical Biblical Commission, of the Document The Interpretation of the Bib le  in  
the Church. 
 
These statements acquire their full weight by the parallelism between that the Son of God 
has become man, on the one hand, and that God’s revelation is expressed in human 
language, on the other. This is how John Paul II puts it in the same address (no. 6): 
 
“The strict relationship uniting the inspired biblical texts with the mystery of the incarnation 
was expressed by the Encyclical Divino afflante Spiritu in the following terms: “Just as the 
substantial Word of God became like man in every respect except sin, so too the words of 
God, expressed in human languages, became like human language in every respect except 
error“ (EB, 559). Repeated almost literally by the Conciliar Constitution Dei Verbum (13), this 
statement sheds light on a parallelism rich in meaning.“ 
 
The third statement is more specifically Catholic, for it concerns the assertion that a natural 
theology is possible. The formulation of the First Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution 
Dei Filius is short: “The … Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning an d end of 
all things, can be known with certitude by the natural light of human reason from created 
things, “for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, 
being understood by the things that are made” (Rom 1:20).”20. This sober assertion can be 
circumscribed in a somewhat narrative manner by saying that Christian Revelation gives to 
understand that it is possible that a healthy person, who has got normally developed 
cognitive capacities, but lacks even the faintest idea about Christianity, is able to come, by 
his or her own intellectual resources, to the following insight: it is adequate to shape a 
proper concept for expressing the innermost state of the things of this world. If that person 
would encounter later the real Christianity, it would become clear to him or her that that 
new concept is equivalent to ‘creation’ or ‘create’, and that the inference to the existence of 
a Creator is true. It must be specified that the Church does not say that the possibility has 
or will become reality. It is rather a statement about the harmony between our world’s 
being created and its intrinsic intelligibility, on the one hand, and the human mind’s 
cognitive capacities, on the other. 
 
Most probably, theologians like Karl Barth would denie the possibility of such a natural 
theology. We need not go into details here, because we are not concerned with natural 
theology. But the Catholic position somehow supports what has been said so far about the 
should be-relationship between Christian Theology, Natural Realism and Physics. Such  a 
corroboration goes like this: the possibility of a natural theology allows the conclusion that 
the laws of nature are not necessarily a product of the model maker’s genius, but might 
well stem from just those material things the behaviour of which they describe. This does 
not exclude a contribution of the model maker’s genius, but it is not the essential part. 
 
It is as if Christian revelation said: “it is almost “forbidden” to use the Bible as a source of 
scientific information. While the Christian revelation has very little to offer with respect to 
the particularities of the laws of nature, it has very much to offer with respect to the 
intelligibility of the things of this world and the human mind’s cognitive capac ities. It is as i f  
Christian revelation gave to understand: “scientists, trust your eyes and your mind! 
Through them you are in contact with reality!” It encourages somehow to not ultimately rely 
on reductionisms, but to trust that the full material reality will disclose itself to the human 
mind. This corroborates a mindset that tries to assimilate that reality, rather than to 
intervene by introducing reductionisms. Others than Christians do not know that, and they 
more easily assimilate less critically the intellectual climate which they are born into. 
 
 
 
20 cf. 1st Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, Chapter 2 (De Revelatione). Cf. DH 3004. 
IV. Intermediate conclusion: opposition of the epistemological climates 
 
Taking both sections II and III together, one can say that: First, present day Physics 
essentially relies on models for prediction, at the cost of making severe reductionisms. 
Models and reductionisms are bound together by the requirement of successful prediction. 
However, the reductionisms heavily reduce the intelligibility of the material processes 
investigated. Low intelligibility in terms of a reductionist terminology leads physicists, on 
the long run, to a deep skepticism, which is not eliminated by the sharp and clear 
rationality of Mathematics. Rather, the latter covers up the former. Second, Christian 
theology supports ordinary experience and language - i.e. the raw material of philosophical 
natural realism - by asserting material things their intelligibility and to the human mind a 
capacity of insight. The “intellectual climates” of physics, on the one hand, and of 
Natural Realism and Catholic Theology, on the other, do not match. This situation is 
not satisfactory, and it is therefore convenient to react. 
 
Stress on intelligibility as the main point of opposition. Here we have reached a 
somehow satisfactory answer to the first in itial question, namely What is the main reason 
for that Physics and Theology do not really match? Unfortunately, public discussion 
completely ignores the important link between the object of knowledge (such as planets, 
atoms, water, protons etc.), on the one hand, and its intelligibility (something between 
completely transparent/intelligible and completely ununderstandable), on the other. 
Instead, public discussion very often focusses on particular questions such as the age of 
the Universe, the beginning and development of the Universe, the age and development of 
the Earth and the historicity of the Flood. Another frequent topic in this context is Fine 
tuning. But the central rôle of the intelligibility of material things suggests that the public 
discussion of the relationship between Physics and Theology should be re-orientated such 
that the philosophical concept of intelligibility occupies its due place. Therefore, the 
second question of how to amend the situation shall be dealt with in the light of 
intelligibility. 
 
 
V. Thoughts about how to avoid the opposition: the idea of control 
 
At this point we might conveniently remember what has been said about the common  
object of both Physics and Theology resp. Christian revelation: both are confined, in  order 
to establish a dialogue, to ordinary experience and language. We have already argued that 
that is not an undeclared methodical naturalism, i.e. a stance which excludes methodically 
the idea of God and, in particular, a Creator. It must be added, that this stance does not 
exclude either the idea of mathematical laws of nature. Rather it leaves both questions – 
God and mathematical laws of nature – open. It cannot be excluded that, by continuing 
to reflect upon what one already knows by ordinary experience, one would find reasonings 
that lead into the neighbourhood of the concept of a Creator-God, on the one hand, and on 
the other, into the neighbourhood of abstract laws of nature. The first way is linked to what 
is commonly called ’natural theology’, the second has not yet received a proper name. In 
this talk, I will follow that second way. 
 
 At first sight, one might feel nostalgy for the sharp rationality of Mathematics, 
which is essential in formulating the laws of nature and which exhibit so much 
coherence and universality. With the same strength, but in opposite direction, one 
might feel repelled by what one expects from natural realism: unexact and flighty 
statements about our material world. In fact, such statements would be absolutely 
unable to achieve a technology our civilization is so proud of. It seems that windmills and 
horse-carriages are the top one can expect from our ordinary understanding. 
 
But no other way seems to show up. This is an additional motive to ernestly explore 
what Natural Realism really can yield, irrespective of what it is commonly believed 
to yield. Moreover, as Mathematics does not belong to the common object of Physics and 
Theology, there is no reason any more to maintain the reductionisms. In fact, dismissing 
the reductionisms is a necessary step towards an authentic dialogue. Because a 
theologian may state that otherwise there is no common object of dialogue, given that 
theologians do not perform any reductionisms. This means nothing less than that, in 
order to be suited for an authentic dialogue with Theology, Physics needs, at least, 
to be enriched with a sort of frame where the reductionisms are absent from the 
very outset. 
 
In order to determine more properly which sort of frame is reasonable, it should be taken 
into account, that the success of Physics is a true success, not a fictitious one. Therefore, 
it would be unreasonable to simply dismiss Physics as a whole. Conversely, it is not 
unreasonable that Physics continues in the same way as it has done to the date. The other 
extreme position would be that the attempt to derive somehow the known successful 
laws of nature from ordinary experience, within the mindset of Natural Realism. But that 
is not only unreasonable, but impossible, because the laws of nature have 
incorporated the reductionisms, and Natural Realism does not consent to perform these 
reductionisms. 
 
Yet, the difference between success and truth should be filled with something. This 
leads to the attempt of looking as carefully as possible at the treasure of ordinary 
experience. One reason to do so is the seemingly unlimited growth of knowledge, which 
according to the mindset of Natural Realism is ultimately rooted in the material things, 
object of our ordinary experience. Knowledge and its growth is not rooted, or only rooted in 
a secondary way, in the physicist’s genius. So we are left with the expectation that it migh t 
be possible to derive something from ordinary experience. This something would be 
independent from reductionisms and could, in the best of cases, be a sort of control of 
what has been achieved under the reductionisms. The word ’control’ is appropriate, 
because current physical models are obtained by reductionisms, and yet pretend to 
describe the full material reality, while a control is obtained from the full reality and 
gives a picture of the full reality. 
 
These considerations stress again that it is important to ask what are the expectations of 
really coming, from Natural Realism, into the neighbourhood of mathematical laws of 
nature. To my mind, there is no a priori reason that provides certainty about that, let alone 
gives an idea of how far one would come on this way of thinking. There is no choice but 
trying to do and, most probably, to endure some thurst periods. Let me just note in passing 
by that Christianity backs powerfully up an attitude in virtue of which somebody tries to 
deal with that topic over and again, with a sort of moral certainty that he will eventually get 
something out of it. Let me outline, supported by this idea, some general  features of 
ordinary experience or, in other words, of Natural Realism. 
 
First distinctions. Historical representatives of Natural Realism are Aristotle, Thomas 
Aquinas, and their disciples through the centuries. One should leave aside, however, 
those who call themselves either transcendental or analytical Aristotelians and Thomists. 
The reason is, to my mind that, on the one hand, transcendental philosophers like Kant 
have made a “critical turn” away from natural Realism. On the other hand, analytical 
philosophers have made what they call a “linguistic turn” which, by and large, passes by 
sense experience without ruling it out by seeing thought and language in a tight parallel: 
”The basic tenet of analytical philosophy, common to such disparate philosophers as 
Schlick, early and late Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Ayer, Austin, Quine and Davidson, may 
be expressed as being that the philosophy of thought is to be equated with the philosophy 
of language; more exactly: (i) an account of language does not presuppose an account of 
thought, (ii) an account of language yields an account of thought, and (iii) there is no other 
adequate means by which an account of thought may be given.”21 
 
Natural Realism cannot be fully systematized. It is important to note that Natural 
Realism is more comprehensive than any particular consistently formulated building of 
metaphysical thought, like what we encounter in Aristotle’s thought of the metaphysical 
categories of substance and accidents, and the principles of act and potency that are 
“operative”, for instance, in the hylomorphic structure of material things. Or what we 
encounter in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, who formulated a sort of synthesis of the 
Aristotelian metaphysical view with the notion of participation inspired by Plato. 
 
Natural Realism can never be completely left. There are many philosophers, who 
follow, to one degree or another, the spirit of Natural Realism. Perhaps the most important 
reason for this is that a person normally is brought up in the mindset of Natu ral Realism 
without his parents need to make any decision to do so. That is to say that Natural 
Realism is not just one philosophical position besides others that can be chosen from a 
philosophical no mans land. It has a priority, not only in a temporal sense, but also in the 
sense of being present in any philosophical position. Even if somebody turns away from 
this connatural intellectual stance, her or she must decide to do so and, despite of that, 
can never completely leave Natural Realism. The philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882-
1950) is an example, insofar he adhered during the first part of his philosophical career the 
Neo-Kantian school of Marburg, but then left it in order to embrace – at least temporarily - 
a position which he himself called ‘Natural Realism’22. However, a closer analysis suggests 
that Hartmann ’s position is close to, though not identical with Aristotle would presumably 
call Natural Realism. 
 
Natural Realism = immediate contact with reality. The most characteristic feature of 
Natural Realism is that a person living within the spirit of Natural Realism is convinced, 
without a need of decision, that he or she perceives and understands something real, i.e. 
independent of him or her. In doing so, he or she becomes aware of the own perceivin g 
and thinking. Therefore, a natural realist is also convinced, explicitly or implicitly, that he or 
she does not primarily perceive own perceptions of the senses and does not primarily think 
own thoughts. He does not need to fabricate representations of what he thinks might stand 
behind his perceptions and thoughts – the “outer world” -. A natural realist is in intimate 
contact with what he comes to call reality, based precisely on that contact. 
 
Natural Realism does not exclude anything. Finally, Natural Realism cannot be 
defined by placing it into a more comprehensive category of human knowledge. The 
reason simply is, that Natural Realism itself does not exclude any sector of human 
knowledge. Accordingly, Natural Realism can be described somehow by saying that it 
does not put any preliminary condition to philosophical inquiry and is careful to not leave 
out anything that comes before the mind’s eyes. Therefore, given that the word 
 
21 Dummett, Michael, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1981, p. 39 
22 Hartmann, Nicolai, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. 1965 (first appeared 1921), chapter 13: ’Natürlicher 
Realismus’, p. 133-134 (first and second paragraph) and p. 134-135 (third paragraph). 
‘reductionism’ gets its content by what ordinary experience tells us and wha t has been 
listed in section II, Natural Realism tries first of all to avoid all sort of reductionisms 
from the very outset in order to do justice to the whole reality. Obviously, it remains 
to be seen whether that yields a sort of control of the losses th rough reductionisms. But 
irrespective of the eventual findings, an argument based on natural realism 
would help the epistemological climates of Physics and Christian Theology to 
approach each other. 
 
* 
 
At this point the fundamental considerations have their end. The first question of this 
talk “What is the Main Reason that Physics and Theology Do Not Really Match?“ has 
got a serious attempt of an answer. The cause of their mismatch is the difference of 
epistemological climates or, in other words, the view that material things are (almost) 
not intelligible versus the view that material things are quite inteligible. We now turn to 
the second question “What can be done to amend that situation?“ That is 
tantamount to ask, how the distant epistemological climates can be made to approach 
each other. It goes almost without saying that the change has to take place on the side 
of Physics. It is quite clear that elaborating a control cannot limit itself to minor re-
arrangements, so to speak, to tactical manoeuvres. It must reach the very foundations. In 
other words, they must be, so to speak, a strategical manoeuvre. Any specification of such 
a manoeuvre should take into account the two following basic facts: 
 
(i) Physics depends on the severe reductionisms, while Theology has no voluntarily made 
reductionisms such as Physics. 
 
(ii) Theology can grow, but only in a way that posterior stages are fully consistent with all 
previous ones. The reason is that a theologians understanding of God’s revelation can grow, 
but God is always identical with Himself. In contrast, Physics has already undergone several 
major changes “of paradigm” [the last two: determinism/indeterminism (quantum theory), and 
the relativity of observer and observed (theories of relativity)]. Therefore, there is no problem 
at all if Physics would change once more. 
 
In other words, Physics is envisaged to undergo another change of paradigm, namely the 
change from doing Physics after the reductionisms without any control or estimate of the 
losses due to the reductionisms to doing Physics after the reductionisms, but together 
with the light of a control or estimate of the losses due to the reductionisms . This 
control would have to be obtained in the mindset in Natural Realism. 
 
The immediate challenge is to find a starting point for the derivation of a control. It is 
likely that much time must be spent with attempts to start from various points, either 
universal aspects or particular experiments like the famous double slit –experiment or 
the Schrödinger’s cat experiment. It is impossible to give a something like a survey. 
This is why we should limit ourselves to a sample of what is covered by a 
control. First, we shall treat briefly, in the following sections, two general topics 
dear to Physics, namely space and dynamics. Then we come to the finding of 
Physics which is, to my mind, the most important one in the last hundred years, 
namely the existence of elementary particles at all. This is foreign to Classical 
Physics. It might well be that here is a change of paradigm. Yet, to date it has gone 
unnoticed. 
 
 
VI. Space and dynamics 
 
VI.a Space 
 
Einstein proposed a classification of notions of space as follows: Space is either conceived 
as 
 
a) positional quality of every single material thing, 
or as 
b) a container of all material things together. 
 
In the first case, there is no space without things, and in the second case, there are no 
things without container, and the container-space exists also without things23. Obviously, 
Newton’s concept of absolute space belongs to Einstein’s category of container space, 
while Aristotle’s concept of place is closer to, but not identical with, the idea of a positional 
quality. 
 
As a container-space has never been observed, we stick to the ’space as positional quality 
of every single material th ing’, even though this alternative has never been seriously taken  
into account. The reasons are easy to find: First of all, one must determine, what a single 
material thing is. Are elementary particles such single material things, or macroscopic solid 
bodies, i.e. huge agglomerations of elementary particles? Second, a space made up of the 
positional qualities of material things seems to become more and more complicated 
together with the increasing number of material things. In practice, it looks like an 
impossibility to deal with billions of billions of billions of positional qualities of elementary 
particles, and the conceptual elegance of such an idea seems to be null. Third, it is unclear 
how material things would relate to their container – what is it to be in a container? In this 
respect, the alternative ‘positional quality’ is much clearer. 
 
Positional qualities of material things are mutual or reciprocal. That is to say, material 
things adopt their positions exclusively with respect to other material things and vice versa. 
Together with the observed “flexibility” of all these relational arrangements – on the 
astronomic level as well as on the level of elementary particles, everything is 
uninterruptedly moving – one is led to the conclusion that they are dynamic. That the 
dynamic positioning of material things is really uninterrupted is confirmed by the fol lowing 
observation: when looking at whatever place of the universe, we observe that solid bodies 
have uninterruptedly clear positions, which vary in a clear way. This means that material 
things interact continuously with each other performing their mutual positioning. It can be 
shown that this argument extends to microscopic things as well, picturing the whole 
universe as a thoroughly dynamic entity. That immediately leads to the question, how it 
can be understood that material things act one upon the other, without that they cease to 
be what they are – different material things. 
 
VI.b Dynamics 
 
It belongs to the most elementary experiences that material things act one upon the other. 
Historically, is has been taken for evident until the beginning of modern time, that things 
really act one upon another. The experience that it does happen, is too overwhelming, 
even though there is no experience, how it happens. This is why the philosophical 
 
23 Jammer, M. Concepts of Space. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993 (3 rd edition), p. XV; first edition 
1953). 
treatment has been satisfied with stating that the effect – that what happens to the receiver 
of an action – belongs to the receiver as well as to the source of the action. Only the way 
of belonging is different: the receiver is the “carrier”, the other thing is the source. Nothing 
material is observed to pass from the source  to the receiver. 
 
This might be difficult to accept and it has been, perhaps, the reason that matter was 
conceived as absolutely inactiv, and that the interactions between material things either 
take place through intermediate material things – the exchange particles in modern particle 
physics – or that interaction is not real, but an impression caused by a prestabilized 
harmony, as Leibniz has it. These alternatives make it difficult to give an account of the 
fact, that ordinary experience as well as Physics uses to characterize things by their very 
interactions. This corroborates the view that action is rooted in material things themselves. 
It makes it more difficult to accept the view of intermediators between them or the view of a 
prestabilized harmony. 
 
Altogether, the compound [space as positional qualities & intrinsic dynamics of the pieces 
of matter] offer a perspective quite different from the container space. The latter does not 
exhibit such a natural connection between both elements as the former does. A particular 
consequence is that the positional-quality-plus-intrinsic-dynamics view yields an 
understanding of the famous double slit –experiment, albeit to date a purely qualitative 
one. That is to say, the particles “feel” always the two slits, irrespective of which slit they 
are passing through. 
 
 
VII. Invariable combinations of invariable properties: the re-
emergence of “substance thinking” instead of “function thinking” 
 
The shift from a container space for all material things together to positional qualities of 
single material things, together with the view that positions are relativ and based on 
interaction of single material th ings and that action as well as receiving action 
(“passion“) is rooted in (different) material things and not a mental structure, focuses 
the attention on the material things. This is how Natural Realism should work. 
 
Without going into details of putting order in the huge body of experiences, one is led to 
the view that elementary particles themselves exhibit themselves to the surrounding 
experimental settings  as individual „pieces of matter“ with an invariable bundle of 
invariable properties (such as electrical charge, spin, helicity, rest mass, etc. 
invariably bound together). Precisely this invariability calls attention, and so elementary 
particle are characterized in this way, i.e. they are grouped into different species. 
 
One might object that the experimental data that lead the experimenter(s) to recognize 
an invariable combination of invariable properties are so many and so fragmented that 
the recognition of such an invariable combination of invariable properties appears to be 
completely arbitrary. To that objection one could reply that, on the one hand, the events 
in the microworld truly are extremely unrestfull, and they can perceived only with a high 
degree of indirectness. The degree of indirectness is even much higher than in the 
case an observer sees his car indirectly through light as medium. There are also 
doubts about whether quarks or gluons are really material realities and not only 
physical names given to mathematical objects. But, against this objection stands the 
firm conviction of all experimental physicists, who have embraced the view of the reality 
of elementary particles notwithstanding their doubts concerning the physical reality of 
particular species such as quarks. 
 
From a natural realist point of view, this is the typical way of how such combinations 
manifest themselves experimentally. They cannot be measured as such, and this might 
be at the background that they are not sufficiently recognized as something superior 
than the single properties belonging to them. Remaining in the framework of Natural 
Realism, the discovery of individuals of species in the microscopic domain reminds 
very much of the Aristotelian analysis of macroscopic bodies as a hylomorphic 
compound. This is quite surprising, because Aristotel had no idea whatsoever of atoms 
and elementary particles; neither of higher mathematics. 
 
That is to say, Aristotle viewed such things as a [thing as individual] and 
complementarily, at the same time, as a [thing as species]. Of course, it would be 
against realist spirit to simply copy something from an author. Nevertheless, these 
ideas – in this particular case, Aristotle’s ideas – might inspire the analysis of the 
modern experimental findings. If these ideas prove to be realistic, the face of Physics 
might change considerably from a property-oriented view of nature to a thing or 
substance-oriented view of nature. Properties would appear as “owned“ by substances. 
More precisely, Physics would continue performing experiments and formulating 
mathematical theories, but both experimental and theoretical activity would be inspired 
and shaped by the unifying substances. In other words, the “function thinking“ would be 
enriched and somehow shaped by a “substance thinking“. 
 
 
VIII. First features of the control of the losses through reductionisms 
and final remark 
 
This outline presents the general ideas, but not any specific consequences. This is why 
one could object that it sounds all very nice, but that nothing will change without an 
elaborated philosophical solution of the internal problem of Physics. Although we cannot 
present the solution in all detail – a control of the losses of knowledge -, we are able to 
indicate (though with some repetitions) in the following the essential ideas and first results. 
 
1. Everybody knows that Mathematics is essential for Physics. It is commonly supposed 
that experiments (including the human experimenter) are, so to speak, the bridge between 
individual material things and abstract mathematical theories. Furthermore, everybody 
knows, how successful physics has been over the three or four last centuries, and that 
there is no reason to think that this development would stop one day. Science and 
technology will continue shaping our civilization. 
 
2. The notion of success is typical for knowledge that refers to practical actions. Purely 
theoretical knowledge would be labeled according to the category of truth. Now, physico-
mathematical theories are a common result of internal principles of Mathematics and 
practical procedures, i.e. experiments. And, according to all experience, a theory meets 
the results of the pertaining experiments only to a degree of more or less precision and 
only within a smaller or greater range. As truth does not admit degrees, success is not 
identical with truth. That is to say that, while the success of a theory is a true success, the 
theory itself is not true in the sense that it faithfully reflects material realities. Theories 
have, thus, an internal truth, but instead of giving a true account of those material realities 
they are referring to, they give only a successful one. 
 
3. One might suspect that the difference between the “outer” success of a theory and its 
“inner” truth is caused by certain knowledge gaps or impediments of knowledge 
acquisition, which also are something “external”. In fact, there is a knowledge gap insofar 
as nobody knows, why experiments can successfully be considered as a bridge between 
individual material things and abstract mathematical theories. However, it is clear that the 
experimenter is indispensable. As to impediments of knowledge acquisition, they are likely 
to be brought about by specific and far-reaching reductionisms performed by the 
experimenter, which are essentially the same throughout Physics. 
 
4. In the last centuries, the strategy in Physics to compensate for both knowledge gaps 
and impediments of knowledge acquisition by establishing mathematically formulated 
hypotheses or models of reality, together with making abstractions and simplifications. 
Obviously, these are measures on the side of the theory. This has become the backbone 
of the methodology of Physics. From an epistemological perspective, this method has 
been increasingly invaded by a strong skepticism which, in turn, has been notably 
corroborated by Kant’s epistemological views. That situation is, however, disguised by the 
clear-cut rationality of Mathematics, as can be seen by the fact that mathematical concepts 
often have got, in Physics, physical names. Despite of all that, the success of Physics 
remains impressive. 
 
5. The better way to diminish the dependence of physical knowledge from hypotheses 
seems to consist in finding out why physico-mathematical theories can be successfully 
applied to material things. Such an inquiry can depart either from the successful physico-
mathematical theories already known, or from the experiential knowledge of material 
things without relying on theories at all. The first alternative is commonly known as 
’scientific realism’, and the literature about that approach increases every day. However, 
very little progress has been made so far. 
 
6. The second approach starts from what everybody knows by mere observation of natural 
material things. This ansatz is rightly called ’natural realism’. It does not make any 
reductionisms and, therefore, would not yield a derivation of existing theories. Instead, 
precisely because of not being affected by any knowledge gaps or impediments of 
knowledge acquisition, it might yield a sort of indirect control of the knowledge gaps and 
the impediments of knowledge acquisition in present day physics. Such a control should 
not be understood as something outside Physics, but rather as a future integral part of it. 
However, this approach has not yet got any attention. 
 
7. Only recently has been done an important step forward in the natural realism -approach. 
It rests on observation and the following three carefully pondered affirmations: 
 
• All (unorganic) material things consist ultimately of  elementary particles. These particles have a 
hylomorphic structure in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. they are individuals of  species; 
 
• Elementary particles, and only these, are sources of  dynamics, i.e. of  activity and passivity. The 
dynamics of  composed (unorganic) material things is determined by the dynamics of  their elementary 
constituents. The dynamics of  elementary particles, in turn, is determined by a sort of  parallelism 
between their hylomorphic constitution and their activity/passivity. Every single elementary particle 
interacts with every other elementary particle and, therefore, every material thing interacts with 
everything else (the physical term is ‘non-locality’.); 
 
• Elementary particles relate to each other by their mutual position, and this positioning is based on their 
dynamics. That is to say that space is not a unique container of  all things, but the collective result of  the 
mutual positioning of all elementary particles. 
 
From this situation have been obtained so far the following (not yet published) conclusions: 
 
• All elementary particles together constitute, by their mutual position, a global dynamical order. (xxx) All 
possible laws of  nature are “embedded” into this global order. 
 
• The positional quality of  every elementary particle can be identif ied with what in Physics is called 
‘particle spin’. Every elementary particle has its spin, and this positional quality is, in a logical sense, the 
particle’s first property. All particles constitute together the “space” by means of  their spin. All other 
properties, like what in Physics is called ‘(inert or gravitational) mass’ or ‘electrical charge’, are logically 
posterior. 
 
• The Newtonian axiom actio = reactio leaves it open whether any two material things interact mutually 
and equally perturb each other, or interact mutually without perturbing each other at all. [A material thing 
is perturbed by other material thing(s) iff its activity upon others also depends on whether it receives 
actions f rom other(s).] The hylomorphic constitution of elementary particles excludes any mutual 
perturbation. 
 
8. These statements tell that material things themselves generate dynamically their mutual 
order. The experimenter does not stand outside that order, but he is part of it. The result 
so far provides a good reason to think that further insights are likely to follow and that this 
approach offers many topics for fruitful investigation. Such investigations can be carried 
out most suitably by philosophers, whose thinking is realist in the Aristotelian sense, and 
who have previously got a good education in Physics. But also scholars of other 
disciplines, who relate somehow to the history of science and general culture (school and 
university education, didactics of Physics, television, literature and, last not least, 
theologians), should take careful notice of that advance. 
 
One final remark about the particularities of this approach. Obviously, it finds itself far 
away from mainstream thinking. If somebody would be interested in searching here a topic 
for his or her long-term academic project, he would certainly find more than enough open 
questions to deal with. But the problem as a whole is not at all easy and would require, 
together with its distance to the mainstream, that such an academic has a certain 
intellectual independence from the mainstream, and also a certain economic 
independence. 
 
* 
 
